The Efficiency Cost of Child Tax Benefits by Kevin J. Mumford
KRANNERT SCHOOL OF 
MANAGEMENT 
 
  Purdue  University 
  West  Lafayette,  Indiana 
 
 








Paper No. 1220 
Date:  November 2008 
Institute for Research in the 












Families with children receive preferential treatment in the U.S. federal income tax.  Over the 
past 15 years, the real value of child tax benefits approximately doubled reaching nearly $1,900 
per child in 2006.  This paper examines the efficiency cost of providing child tax benefits.  A 
representative agent model is used to show how the efficiency cost of providing child tax 
benefits depends on labor supply and fertility elasticities.  The model reveals that cross-price 
substitution effect for labor supply and children is of primary importance in calculating the 
efficiency cost.  However, there are no estimates of this parameter in the literature.  This paper 
uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate this parameter.  
The estimated cross-price substitution effect implies that children and time spent outside of 
employment are complements.  This implies that the full cost of providing child tax benefits is 
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Families with children receive preferential treatment in the U.S. federal income tax.  The 
budgetary cost of these child tax benefits is about $140 billion in 2006, or nearly $1,900 per 
child.  This is larger than the tax expenditure from the deductibility of mortgage interest for 
owner-occupied homes, larger than the tax expenditure from the deductibility of state and local 
taxes (including property taxes), and even larger than the tax expenditure from the exclusion of 
employer contributions to medical insurance premiums.  As shown in Table 1, the real value of 
child tax benefits approximately doubled over the past decade and a half due to the expansion of 
existing tax provisions and the creation of new provisions.  The $140 billion annual cost of child 
tax benefits is a direct measure of the value of tax revenue not received and payment made to 
families with children due to child tax benefit provisions. 
 
Table 1: Estimated Budgetary Cost of Child Tax Benefits (billions) 
    1992 1996 1999 2004 2006 
Dependent Exemption  24.1 30.7 35.8 36.4 35.9 
Earned Income Credit  13.0 28.2 31.3 38.0 40.2 
Child Tax Credit  -  -  19.9  31.2  56.2 
Child  Care  Expenses  3.4 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.9 
Head  of  Household  Status  3.0 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 
                                          TOTAL  43.5 65.8 93.8  113.1  140.3 
Number  of  Children  (millions)  66.5 70.2 71.9 73.3 73.7 
Expenditure per Child  $654  $937  $1,305  $1,543  $1,904 
Real Expenditure per Child  $940  $1,204  $1,579  $1,647  $1,904 










 However, the true cost of providing child tax benefits should also incorporate economic 
efficiency considerations.  The efficiency implications of child tax benefits are derived using a 
representative agent model where the agent decides how much time to spend working and how 
many children to have.  The assumption is that parents, to a large extent, determine the number 
of children in their family.  Therefore, government subsidization of children may distort fertility 
choices. 
Section 2 shows how the efficiency cost of child tax benefits depends on the cross-price 
substitution effect for leisure (time not spent doing market work) and children.  Section 3 uses 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate this parameter.  The 
estimation suggests that children and leisure time are complements.  This implies that imposing a 
tax on children rather than a child subsidy would be efficient.  This does not mean that a child 
tax would be optimal, only that child tax benefits reduce economic efficiency and that this cost 
should be weighed against any social welfare gains. 
2. Representative Agent Model 
Consider a representative agent that chooses how much time to spend working and the number of 
children to have. Because this is a representative agent, social welfare is represented by the 
agent’s utility function 
   (1)  (,, ) UCLN
where C is consumption, L is leisure time (non-market work time), and N is the number of 
children.   
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 By assumption, raising children requires money but no time, or alternatively, time spent 
raising children is counted as leisure time.  Leisure time is defined as T – H, where T is the time 
endowment and H is the hours of market work.  Thus, all time other than time spent working for 
pay is considered leisure time.  By this definition, time spent cooking, cleaning, caring for 
children, and any other home production activity is counted as leisure time.   
The government has the ability to impose a linear income tax and can either subsidize or tax 
children, but must raise revenue R. There are no lump-sum taxes or subsidies and consumption is 
untaxed.  This is equivalent to a model with a consumption tax and no income tax.  The tax or 
subsidy of children is simply disproportionate taxation of children relative to consumption 
goods.  By taking the price of consumption as the numeraire, we can write the budget constraint 
as 
  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) N wT Y C wL P N τ τ −+ = +−+ + θ  (2) 
where w is the wage rate, τ is the income tax rate, Y is non-wage income, and PN (1+θ) is the 
after-subsidy cost of raising a child.  A negative value of θ is a child subsidy.  By assumption, it 
takes expenditure level PN  to raise each child, and any child-related expenditure above this 
necessary level is considered consumption. 
In this model it is possible to derive conditions under which it is optimal to subsidize, rather 
than tax, the presence of children in a family.  Because there is a single representative agent and 
the government must raise revenue R, the optimal tax policy is simply the policy that is most 
efficient at raising the required revenue.  As will be shown, the optimal tax treatment of children 
in this simple model primarily depends on the cross-price substitution effect between leisure and 
children. 
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 The efficiency cost of a tax policy is measured by its excess burden, that is, the loss of utility 
greater than would have occurred had the tax revenue been collected as a lump sum (Auerbach, 
1985).  The excess burden of a tax policy is the loss in social welfare due to the distortion in 
relative prices only and not that which is due to the tax-induced loss of income.  To calculate the 
exact excess burden, it is necessary to select an explicit utility function.  Rather than do this, we 
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where ti is the tax rate on good i and Sij is the substitution effect for good i given an increase in 
the price of good j.  The optimal tax policy is the one that minimizes the Hotelling-Hicks-
Harberger approximation of excess burden while still raising revenue R. 
In this model, the excess burden is simply the sum of the three compensated deadweight loss 
triangles for consumption, leisure, and children.  By assumption, the only distortions in the 
economy are those caused by the tax policy.  All goods are produced under constant returns by 
competitive firms employing labor as the only input, so there are no profits.  Consumption is 
untaxed, which enables us to drop the first of the three compensated deadweight loss triangles in 
the excess burden expression.  The remaining compensated demands for leisure and children are 
both potentially affected by changes in either price:  
  () ( ) () () ( ) (
1
2
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 The symmetry of the Slutsky matrix means that SNL = SLN.  For analytical convenience, we will 
scale the units of leisure and children so that they are expressed in dollar terms.  This 
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The first order conditions with respect to τ and θ can be solved to yield: 


























where λ is the multiplier on the government budget constraint.  Evaluated at the optimum, this 
multiplier is positive because the excess burden of a tax policy is increasing in the revenue 
requirement, R.  The denominators for both (6) and (7) are non-negative because this expression 
is the determinant of a second order principal minor of the Slutsky matrix which is negative 
semidefinite.  
Determining whether it is optimal to subsidize or tax the presence of children in a family is 
then reduced to signing the following expression: 
  LL LN SN SH +  (8) 
A child subsidy is optimal if and only if SLL N + SLN H > 0.  Both N and H are constrained to be 
non-negative and SLL is non-positive by definition, so it is the value of SLN that is key in 
determining if a child subsidy is optimal. A necessary condition for the optimal tax policy to 
include child subsidies is that children and leisure time be substitutes. 
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 Result 2.1 If leisure and children are complements (SLN < 0) then it is not optimal to subsidize 
children. 
Recall that in this model, there are only two uses of time, leisure and market work.  An 
equivalent way to express this result is that if labor supply and children are substitutes then it is 
not optimal to subsidize children.  An intuitive explanation for this result comes from 
considering how the compensated demand for each good is affected by the tax policy.  If leisure 
and children are complements (SLN < 0) then an increase in τ increases the compensated demand 
for both leisure and children whereas an increase in θ decreases the compensated demand for 
both leisure and children. The income tax distortions are reduced by imposing a tax on children.  
If leisure and children are substitutes (SLN > 0) an increase in τ increases the compensated 
demand for leisure but decreases the compensated demand for children.  The income tax 
distortions are reduced by giving a child subsidy.  Providing child tax benefits is costly in that 
the income tax rate must be increased in order to finance the benefits, so only when leisure and 
children are strong substitutes (as shown in Figure 1) is it optimal to provide child tax benefits.  
This strong substitute result was first derived in a three-good representative agent model by 
Corlett and Hague (1954) and directs our attention to measuring the cross-price substitution 
effect.  Figure 1 depicts how the optimal child tax treatment varies with the cross-price 
substitution effect for leisure and children.   
Of course, the point of providing child tax benefits is not efficiency.  Child tax benefits and 
other child subsidies are provided because they redistribute to families with children who 
presumably have a higher marginal utility of income.  I am not aware of any study that provides 
empirical evidence that the marginal utility of income for a family is increasing in the number of 
children, but I suspect that this may be the case.  Child subsidies benefit society on net only if the 
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 welfare gain from redistribution outweighs the efficiency cost.  If leisure and children are 
complements or weak substitutes, then there is an efficiency cost which should be weighed 
against the gain from redistribution. 
 
Figure 1: Optimal child Tax Treatment 
 
 
While this simple model of labor supply and fertility choice abstracts from various 
characteristics of children, externalities associated with children, pre-existing taxes and 
subsidies, and differences across families, this model provides a useful starting point to examine 
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 the efficiency cost of child tax benefits. In this model, the case for subsidizing children primarily 
depends on the cross-price substitution effect for leisure and children, a parameter that has 
received little attention in the empirical literature. 
3. Data and Estimation 
I use cross-sectional variation in the NLSY to estimate the cross-price substitution effect for 
leisure and children.  The data for this exercise is a sample of women from the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  The NLSY contains detailed labor supply and fertility 
information for each respondent from 1979 to 2004.  The sample is restricted to women who 
were 16 to 20 when first interviewed in 1979.  This restriction enables labor supply and earnings 
histories to be constructed from age 19 until age 43.  The number of children born to each 
woman by age 43 is also obtained.  The women in the sample were interviewed annually from 
1979 to 1994 and then biennially from 1996 to 2004.  Women for which it is not possible to 
construct a complete labor supply or fertility history are dropped from the sample. 
The decision to use a sample of women rather than a sample of married couples is motivated 
by the fact that approximately one-third of all births in the United States are to unmarried 
women.  I use panel data, rather than a cross section, so that the analysis can be performed using 
each woman’s fertility history.  Using a cross section, we could only observe the number of 
children born and the woman’s wage (if she is employed) at that point.   
Three relationship categories are defined: married, partnership, single.  Nearly all of the 
women in the sample are single at age 19 and about 88 percent are married for some period of 
time between age 19 and 43.  Only 8 percent never report being married or in a partnership. 
Some women move between relationship categories several times. In this exercise, the 
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 relationship history is taken as exogenous as are the labor supply and earnings of husbands and 
partners.   
The choice variables in the representative agent model are the average labor supply of the 
woman and the total number of children that she has. In the data, the average hours of market 
work is not the answer to a particular survey question asking how many hours per week she 
works when employed.  Rather, it is created from a series of more than a thousand questions 
asking how many hours she worked week by week over the previous period.  This measure of the 
average hours of work does not distinguish between a part-time worker who is employed 
continuously from age 19 to 43 and a full-time worker who is employed for only half that time 
period. 
After removing observations that do not have complete birth, work, and earnings histories, 
the sample consists of 4,169 of the 6,283 women in the NLSY. All dollar amounts are inflation 
adjusted to year 2000 dollars using the CPI-U before averaging. An implied wage is calculated as 
the real average annual earnings divided by the average annual hours. The sample averages are 
reported in Table 2. 
The married, partner, and single variables measure the fraction of time from age 19 until 43 
that the individual is married, living with a partner, or single.  The income of the husband or 
partner as well as any nonwage income, including welfare benefits, are combined into a single 
nonwage income variable.  The moved variable indicates whether the individual's family moved 
to a different town while she was growing up.  The summary statistics for variables indicating 
whether the individual lived with both biological parents until age 14 and whether either parent 
is an immigrant are also listed. 
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 Table 2: Sample Averages by Hours of Work 
(computed using sample weights) 
 
  All   Hours > 0  Hours = 0  
Observations   4,169  4,059  110  
Sample  Weight    1 0.985 0.015   
Weekly Hours   26.43  26.83  0  
Annual Earnings   18,084.51  18,362.11  0  
Nonwage Income   27,867.33  28,001.11  19,152.40  
Hourly Wage   12.45  12.45  - 
Children    1.958 1.944 2.856   
Married    0.566 0.569 0.366   
Partner    0.071 0.070 0.123   
Single    0.363 0.361 0.511   
White    0.776 0.782 0.394   
Hispanic    0.062 0.060 0.191   
Black    0.144 0.140 0.382   
Other  Race    0.017 0.017 0.033   
Rural    0.219 0.220 0.132   
Moved    0.570 0.571 0.517   
Mother Education   11.54  11.57  9.20  
Both Parents (14)   0.616  0.618  0.439  
Immigrant  Parents    0.086 0.086 0.111   
 
For those women with no reported hours of market work over the full time period, no wage 
calculation can be made.  This is unfortunate because an observed wage rate is essential in 
estimating the cross-price substitution effect for leisure and children.  Therefore, the 110 women 
with no observed hours of market work are dropped from the sample. 
It is apparent from Table 2 that the women for whom it is not possible to calculate an average 
wage rate are quite different from the remaining sample.  This is particularly true with respect to 
their family background and fertility choices.  No effort is made to correct for the selected nature 
of the remaining sample as this would require the specification of a participation equation, a 
wage equation, and exclusion restrictions.  Because nearly 99 percent of the sample has an 
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 observable wage, the sample selection correction would not likely yield much additional insight, 
but would certainly add to the complexity. 
A common approach to estimating a substitution effect in a static model is to estimate a 
linear (in levels or logs) demand equation that includes a wage variable and a nonwage income 
variable. This is particularly common in the labor supply literature where an econometrician 
estimates a labor supply function of this form: 
  01 2
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xj i i α αα α
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j i i
 (9) 
where xji is one of the predetermined characteristics of the individual that is observed by the 
econometrician and εi represents those unobserved characteristics that affect labor supply.  The 
labor supply function should depend not only on the wage, but also on the prices of all other 
goods.  By assuming that the vector of other prices is not individual specific, these other prices 
can be dropped from the regression.  Identification of the labor supply elasticity comes from 
exogenous cross-sectional variation in the wage.  
This same approach can be used to estimate the cross-price substitution effect for leisure and 
children.  I specify a linear child demand function that depends on the wage, nonwage income, 
and predetermined observed characteristics: 
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x β ββ β
=
=+ + + + ∑ ε  (10) 
Ideally, the individual specific cost of raising children (own price) should also be included in this 
specification. The absence of this variable is cause for some concern because the demand of a 
good clearly depends on its own price.  The high degree of uncertainty about the level of 
expenditure required to raise a child – and how this level changes with family size, family 
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 income, and other factors – severely complicates determining an individual specific cost of 
raising a child.  Similar to the argument for the exclusion of other prices in a labor supply 
equation, one could argue that there is little individual specific variation in the direct cost of 
raising a child.  However, differences in child tax benefits by income level, family economies of 
scale, and geographical differences in the cost of food, housing, and health care suggest that this 
may not be the case.  The direction of the bias in the estimates from this heterogeneity in the cost 
of raising children is not clear. 
There is a serious concern that the decision to have a child has a direct influence on the wage 
or that some unobserved factors that influence the decision to have a child are correlated with the 
wage.  There are several observed characteristics like the month and year of birth and measures 
of the reading habits of the individual's parents that could serve as instruments for the wage.  
However, instrumental variables estimation gives a very similar estimate of the cross-price 
elasticity.  The IV estimate of the cross-price elasticity is more negative than the OLS estimate, 
although not significantly different; implying that the OLS estimate is perhaps biased downward.  
Using a Hausman test of endogeneity, we fail to reject that the wage is exogenous.  However, 
this may be due to weak instruments.  Because the results are similar, I report only the OLS 
estimates here. 
The estimated cross-price substitution effect (compensated) for leisure and children is 
given by 
_____ _____
1 ˆ eaernings nonwage income 2 ˆ ββ ⎛ −⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟  as indicated by the Slutsky decomposition: 
 
 children  children earnings  children
  
 wage  wage nonwage income  nonwage income
c
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ∂
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (11) 
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 The estimation of equation (10) is given in Table 3.  The reported income and substitution 
effects are calculated using the sample average earnings and nonwage income for the sample 
with positive hours of work. 
Table 3: Linear Child Demand Estimation 












nonwage income    0.0191 
(0.0011)** 
  0.0206 
(0.0011)** 
  0.0080 
(0.0013)** 
  0.0078 
(0.0013)** 
  0.0203 
(0.0011)** 
married        1.372 
(0.080)** 
  1.372  
(0.080)** 
 





constant    1.701 
(0.072)** 
  1.996 
(0.133)** 
  1.156 
(0.084)** 
  1.208 
(0.165)** 
  1.918 
(0.162)** 
race & region controls  yes yes yes yes yes 
family controls no yes yes yes yes 
religion controls  no no no yes  yes 
observations  4059 4059 4059 4059 4059 
R-squared  0.1005 0.1422 0.2020 0.2063 0.1473 
Total Effect  -0.0308 -0.0232 -0.0160 -0.0157 -0.0229 
Income Effect    0.0125    0.0135     0.0052    0.0051    0.0133 








Across specifications, the estimated substitution effect is negative.  In the representative 
agent model, this implies that the optimal child tax treatment is a tax on children.  A back of the 
envelope calculation puts the optimal child tax in the range of $100 to $800 per child.
1  





for any social gains from child tax benefits, and thus we are only measuring the efficiency cost 
and ignoring the benefits.  The United States currently provides child tax benefits equal to about 
$1,900 per child.  This estimate of the cross-price substitution effect can be used to calculate the 
excess burden of a $1,900 child subsidy.  I calculate the excess burden to be in the range of $330 
to $475 per child.  This implies that the true cost of child tax benefits is about 20 percent larger 
than the reported budgetary cost of $140 billion. 
4. Conclusion 
The budgetary cost of child tax benefits in the U.S. is large and, if history is to be our guide, will 
likely continue to grow.  In a representative agent model, the efficiency cost of child tax benefits 
depends on the cross-price substitution effect for children and leisure (non-market work time).  I 
use NLSY data to estimate this cross-price substitution effect and find that the estimates are 
negative across specifications.  This implies that there is an additional efficiency cost that should 
be added to the budgetary cost when calculating the true cost of providing child tax benefits. 
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